

April 28, 2025 Iberian Grid Blackout

Technical Summary – Based on
REE's Live Briefing and possible
Trigger explanations

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Event Timeline

- 12:33 CET – Sudden defect (cause unknown).
- Immediate disconnection of a major power plant in SW Spain.
- 1,5 seconds later – A second major plant disconnects in the same area.
- Followed by:
 - PV generation tripping off
 - Disconnection from France
 - Cascading failure and partial blackout



What could triggered the First Plant Trip?



- Likely cause: sudden defect, that triggered Solar PV or Nuclear, not yet known.
- Plant protection relays triggered automatic disconnection.
- Protection logic designed to avoid damage from unstable grid conditions.
- Consistent with grid disturbance behavior and historical events.



What Triggered the Second Trip (1.5s Later)?

- Out-of-step detection is a key suspect:
 - - Phase angle between buses became unsustainable.
- System may have lost local synchronism.
- Could also be a cascading voltage instability after first trip.



Role of Grid Protections

- Automatic undervoltage protection triggered second trip, after first trip of first power plant.
- Plants are not designed to 'ride through' deep undervoltages.
- No LVRT-like function in old nuclear or large thermal units.
- Coordinated tripping is a defensive mechanism to prevent damage.

Loss of Synchronism and Phase Shift

- If angle difference between zones exceeds safe limits, synchronism is lost.
- Out-of-step protections isolate affected units.
- Prevents equipment damage, but deepens instability if multiple units trip.



Why BESS and Grid-Forming Inverters Matter

- BESS can absorb/extract power instantly to stabilize frequency.
- Grid-Forming inverters help sustain voltage references.
- Without these, grid collapses cascade quickly from N-1 to N-2.
- Spain and Portugal needs fast-acting, distributed stability assets.

Nuclear Plants Behavior

- Spanish nuclear plants automatically disconnect on severe voltage swings.
- Nuclear power in Spain probably would not comply with LVRT (Low Voltage Ride Through), according to Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/631
- Safety-first logic: Protect reactor integrity over grid continuity.
- Aligned with international nuclear safety protocols.



Spinning Reserve in Spain

- Must-run generation required by the TSO in Spain is more than 3 GW.
 - In the moment of the event, synchronous generation was much bigger than that.
- Always synchronized with the grid.
- If the running generation is lower than 3 GW then a blackout is likely probable to happen.
- Happens regardless of energy source (solar, wind, thermal, etc.).

Summary of Trigger Hypothesis

- First trip: sudden defect → protection trip.
- Second trip: out-of-step event or local voltage collapse.
- Followed by:
 - - Solar tripping (weak voltage support).
 - - Disconnection from France.
 - - System-wide collapse due to N-2 condition.



Key Lessons

- The system is designed to withstand the loss of the biggest online generator. But yesterday's events probably were more severe than design criteria
- The system wasn't designed to withstand N-2 events.
- Grid-forming inverters must be properly integrated and tuned.
- BESS is crucial for modern grid resilience.
- LVRT must be installed in old CCGT, because it's not possible to install LVRT in the old Spanish Nuclear Power plants, due to the design of the same
- Spain and other grids need:
 - Virtual inertia
 - Fast digital control systems
 - Distributed, responsive reserve mechanisms

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