π At 12:33 CET, the Iberian grid faced a sudden defect (cause still under investigation).
π Immediate trip of a major power plant in Southwest Spain.
β±οΈ 1.5 seconds later, another key plant disconnected in the same zone.
β‘ Chain reaction:
Massive solar PV disconnections π
Disconnection from France π
Cascading system failure β partial blackout.
π Root Causes:
1οΈβ£ First Trip: Protection systems triggered by a defect.
2οΈβ£ Second Trip: Loss of synchronism (out-of-step protection or local voltage collapse).
3οΈβ£ PV generation lacks sufficient voltage support under critical conditions.
4οΈβ£ System collapse following an N-2 event, far beyond normal design criteria.
β’οΈ Nuclear plants in Spain automatically disconnect under severe voltage swings β
β‘οΈ They are NOT designed to perform LVRT (Low Voltage Ride Through) as renewables do.
π Spinning reserve: Spain maintains >3 GW of must-run synchronous generation.
β‘οΈ If spinning reserve drops or is destabilized, blackout becomes highly probable β regardless of whether generation is solar, wind, or thermal.
π§ Key Lessons:
Iberia needs BESS π and Grid-Forming Inverters β‘ to stabilize frequency and voltage immediately.
Old assets (especially nuclear and thermal) cannot react fast enough.
Virtual inertia, fast digital controls, and distributed reserves are no longer optional β they are essential.
Our assessment Iberian_Grid_Instability_vs1_1: